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Kingseed: First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Countrya World

high. The book’s highlights include insightful overviews of the U.S. and British navies during the Cold War era by
George W. Baer and Eric Grove, and a
piece on the current and future direction of the Royal Navy by Geoffrey Till.
Because the authors are able to examine
specific navies and periods in some detail, this volume illustrates more effectively than Navies of Europe the full
range of political, economic, and technological factors that typically shape a
state’s naval policy.
CHRISTOPHER BELL

Dalhousie University

Zimmermann, Warren. First Great Triumph:
How Five Americans Made Their Country a World
Power. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux,
2002. 562pp. $30

The path of America’s rise to global
dominance has always attracted the attention of distinguished historians and
political scientists, ranging from Henry
Adams to Walter LaFeber to Stephen E.
Ambrose. Warren Zimmermann, a
thirty-three-year veteran of the Foreign
Service, joins the fray with First Great
Triumph, a provocative analysis of the
“fathers of American imperialism” at
the onset of the twentieth century.
Zimmermann examines how President
Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, naval theorist Alfred
Thayer Mahan, Secretary of State John
Hay, and Secretary of War Elihu Root
engineered American imperial expansion in the decade from 1898 to 1908.
Why these five men? Zimmermann
claims not only that they were influential in establishing the United States as a
global power but that their characters
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and beliefs helped determine how that
power would be used. In essence, this
book is about imperialism by “Roosevelt
and his friends.” Zimmermann also
gives due credit for constructing the
first overseas empire to Admiral George
Dewey, Leonard Wood, Philippine colonial governor William H. Taft, and
President William McKinley. Regrettably, he downplays the contributions of
Admiral Stephen B. Luce and Secretary
of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy, both of
whom influenced Mahan in the development of his naval theories.
Graduates of the Naval War College
will find Zimmermann’s analysis of
Mahan’s career particularly interesting.
Zimmermann’s Mahan is the preeminent American strategist of his generation, a “pen and ink sailor” who in
midcareer found himself “out of sorts
with the navy which accurately considered him a misfit and a complainer.” At
home in Newport, Rhode Island,
Mahan articulated a doctrine of
seapower as the controlling factor to
national greatness. Like George
Kennan, who authored the containment doctrine a half-century later,
Mahan inspired American foreign policy with his insightful analysis of America’s position among nations.
The centerpiece of this work, however,
is undoubtedly Roosevelt. Roosevelt
constructed the first true imperial presidency and ushered in the “American
Century.” Fresh from his heroics during
the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt
was catapulted to the White House
upon the assassination of William
McKinley. By the time he departed
eight years later, the United States was
the dominant force in the Caribbean
and a major presence in Asia. On the
strength of his marshaling of public
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opinion and judicious use of America’s
economic and military power, Roosevelt,
not Woodrow Wilson, emerges as the
true “father of American diplomacy.”
During the Roosevelt administration,
American foreign policy combined national power with what Zimmermann
terms “high purpose.”
Zimmermann offers equally compelling
character sketches of the other members of Roosevelt’s team. Lodge emerges
as a political manipulator who guides
imperialist policies through Congress.
Hay contributes to American hegemony
in the Western Hemisphere by developing closer ties with Great Britain, while
Root creates the first American colonial
administration, in the aftermath of the
Spanish-American War. Their combined efforts made their country a
power to be reckoned with on the international scene.
However, Zimmermann’s crystal ball
looks far bleaker as the United States enters the twenty-first century. Here
Zimmermann’s interpretation is based on
too much conjecture and too little fact.
Despite the massing of American military might in the Middle East in the aftermath of 11 September, Zimmermann
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opines, this country faces an erosion of
its power due to a weakening of the
U.S. presidency and the reemergence of
congressional dominance in foreign
policy. Additionally, he sees a current
trend toward nonmilitary involvement
and an unwillingness to commit military forces in support of foreign policy.
Lastly, Zimmermann posits that international terrorism has produced a
backlash against U.S. policies as well as
the cultural, ideological, and economic
principles that guide the United States.
In summary, Zimmermann offers a
provocative interpretation about American imperialism during the last century
and a chilling prognostication for the
current one. The reader is more likely to
concur with his thesis that the expansion
of the United States to an international
power was not an aberration but a culmination of forces that had dominated
the political and economic scene since
its birth, than with the decline in the
power of the presidency, which is more
a function of personality than of the
reemergence of legislative authority.
COLE C. KINGSEED

Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired
New Windsor, New York
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